By Alex Willingham
From Southern Changes, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987
Since
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, black voter participation has improved
dramatically, often operating as an integral part of winning coalitions.
However, under-registration and low voter turnout continue to handicap the
black population in the South. This is the uncomfortable fact behind claims of
an influential black vote made after the Jesse Jackson campaign in the 1984
presidential primaries and again after the 1986 elections. Such claims were
fueled by certain black political leaders and also by conservative whites
smarting over the defeat of incumbent Southern senators who failed to attract
black votes in 1986. Both groups have a special interest in exaggerating the
importance of the black vote. But the reality is that blacks in the South, even
some in key jurisdictions, are neither registering nor voting in respectable
numbers.
A
case in point is the 1986 campaign in Georgia's Fifth Congressional district
where John Lewis won election over Julian Bond. The district is centered in
Atlanta and includes black voters with an active history of participation. Both
Bond and Lewis are well-known veterans of the civil rights movement and voter
registration work. For the heated run-off between them less than sixty percent
of the eligible blacks in Fulton county (the bulk of the district) were
registered to vote, and barely more than a third actually cast ballots. Limited
registration and turnout did not prevent the election of a black Congressman
there, but only because court-ordered redistricting provided a large black
majority; in a district with the same black registration and turnout, but with
a smaller black majority, a viable white candidate might have beaten Bond or
Lewis.
In
the Second Congressional district in Mississippi, black citizens--though a
majority--were unable in 1982 and 1984 to elect a U. S. Congressman. In 1986
when the district elected Mike Espy to become Mississippi's only black
congressman, it was considered an upset although he was elected over a white in
a district with 57 percent black population. Despite the large percentage of
blacks in the South, Lewis and Espy will serve with just two other black
colleagues among the 138 Southerners in the 100th Congress.
In
a real sense, these are protected victories, won through the reapportionment
process. And reapportionment, the most important election reform strategy of
recent years, has been so successful it is now nearly exhausted as a remedy.
The single-member district is now widely used throughout the South. From
courthouse to statehouse, thousands of at-large elective offices once
unattainable to minority candidates have been transformed into districts which
give ample expression to black voting choices and, due to segregated housing
patterns, just about assure election of black candidates.
The
momentum for districting remains strong. The Alabama legislature has enacted
local courtesy laws enabling a cluster of Black Belt counties to convert to
singlemember districts for the election of county governing bodies and school
boards. Another l70 Alabama jurisdictions may convert to single-member
districts under terms of a pending lawsuit. In Mississippi all county
supervisors are elected from single-member districts. Even Southern
legislatures, the bodies responsible for reapportionment, are elected from
single-member districts in eight of the Southern states; only a few
multi-member districts remain in Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina.
Generally,
the federal courts have upheld single-member districting as one effective
remedy for electoral discrimination even as legislative and administrative
policies have moved in regressive directions. In Thornburg v. Gingles, a 1986 decision on North Carolina's
legislative reapportionment, the U.S. Supreme Court disallowed several at-large
features of a districting plan and specifically emphasized that the election of
racial minorities should be considered a critical factor in evaluating election
systems. The Thornburg decision has been considered pivotal because the Reagan
Administration entered the case and made a special argument, rejected by the
Court, that would have restricted the reach of reapportionment law.
Mere
conversion to single-member districts does not settle the issue of
discrimination in elections. The problem is illustrated in cases such as that
of the Mississippi county supervisors where, despite single-member districts,
blacks account for only 38 of the state's 410 supervisory positions although
blacks are a substantially larger percentage of the state's population. A
similar pattern holds among the Southern state legislatures. Even with the
large-scale conversion to single-member legislative districts, for example,
blacks would have to more than double their present number of state legislative
seats merely to match their numbers in the region's population. As
single-member districts come more into use, a remaining issue--and one likely
to dominate the 1990 round of reapportionment--is how to draw districts so as
to create effective minority constituencies.
Recent
reforms have been based on certain key assumptions which justify the priority
given to the reapportionment strategy: that Southern state voting policies
would be retrogressive, that blacks would under-participate relative to whites,
that cross-racial coalitions would be unlikely, and that minorities would not
be elected to single executive and state wide offices. These assumptions can
now be reviewed.
Southern state policies on voter participation, traditionally hostile to the black voter, have been improving. Flexible voter registration hours, satellite registration sites and deputy registrars are now more common. Election officials in several states publicly and systematically encourage voter registration.
While
barriers to voting have diminished, differential rates of voter participation
continue. And when this is combined with white racial bloc voting the results
could be an artificial constraint on the political development that will come
to the region. In the past, allowance has been made for underparticipation by
using the redistricting process to draw black districts with extraordinary
majorities. This practice has been effective in the short-run but has serious
drawbacks as a long-run tactic. Such compensatory districting may encourage
packing, a new wrinkle in racial gerrymandering which could be a threat
remaining long after the classic vote dilution techniques--including at large
voting--have been swept away.
One
danger is that ostensibly black-controlled districts may be intentionally drawn
where powerful white factions continue to control political office. For
example, by putting most of the 30 percent black population of a given county
in a single almost exclusively black district, blacks might elect one of five
commissioners, who would consistently be on the losing end of 4-1 commission
decisions. The remaining blacks in the county might be split among several majority
white districts where they compete with a dominant voting bloc and have no
ability to influence decisions. A perception of representation might develop,
among both blacks and whites, which reduces the minority community to its
"own" elected officials. This result would lead to disillusionment as
surely as the failure of blacks to win offices in districts with only slight
black majorities.
Recent
reforms have been based on a pessimistic assumption about the prospects of
cross-racial voter coalitions. The reality of white racial bloc voting,
particularly when combined with the differential rates of participation, is a
strong factor in assessing the racial impact of election mechanics. But voter
coalitions are critical to future advances. The building of such coalitions
will depend, in large measure, on racial attitudes of white voters, but a key
ingredient will be maximization of the voting potential of the minority
population.
Furthermore,
single-member redistricting reforms do not reach certain levels. They have
brought mixed results in Congressional races; they are ineffective in single
executive and state-wide offices. Except for the special case of judges, only
one black holds a state-wide elected office in the South.
The
significance of voter registration and education are clear. Yet there is
growing doubt that current efforts and organizations will be capable of meeting
the challenge. The Voter Education Project (VEP), historically responsible for
increasing black voter participation in the region is facing major problems.
For several years now it has been in serious financial, organizational and
structural disarray. Even before its current troubles, the political dynamics
in the region were presenting an increasingly difficult challenge to voter registration
efforts.
The
crisis at VEP was not entirely caused by internal factors. It grew out of two
things. First there was the overall shift in voting rights efforts from
community organizing to formal litigation, a shift that came to dominate voting
rights strategy in VEP's Deep South territory. Second, there was a shift in the
object of organizing from support for overall consensus candidates (often at
the presidential level) to mobilization in the context of highly partisan local
campaigns. Key elections sometimes feature competition among black candidates
in majority-black single-member districts; at other times they consist of black
incumbents unopposed for reelection.
In
1985, when the national philanthropic foundations issued the report criticizing
VEP, the focus was on over allocation of money to administration as opposed to
field work. But VEP, or any other organization doing effective voter
participation work, will have to come to grips with the changing conditions of
Southern politics and of the role of minority voters therein. Some dramatic
efforts to address the issue have had little impact. In 1984 lawsuits were
filed in several southern states seeking to compel state officials to
affirmatively register voters. VEP itself shifted tactics and went to court
over registration practices in Georgia.
But
this overall effort has stalled and cannot be expected to bring results in the
near future.
The
Jackson Campaign and its Rainbow Coalition proposed a seductive way out of the
voter participation dilemma--charismatic leadership based in black church
organization. Whether that will have a long-run impact on minority voter
participation is doubtful (there is some reason to believe that black church
politics is an extension of the partisan pattern now emerging). In the short
run the Jackson mobilization has not significantly expanded black voting and,
indeed, Rainbow candidates have become one more element competing for support
within the same restrictive franchise.
The
Jackson method also places heavy emphasis on race in its mobilization drives.
But conditions in the South today require an active voter to exercise the
franchise in circumstances where such cues are not dependable guides because
election choices are more matter-of-fact calculations. Powerful white factions
seeking to realign Southern politics, and restrict bi-racial governance,
encourage racial cueing by blacks as a strategy for delegitimation. Emphasis on
the racial cue also invites counter mobilization by elevating this visible
aspect of the candidate (or proposition) among Southern white voters a group
not unaccustomed to making its election choices by such a standard. Depressed
voter participation in the Southern black population remains despite the
Rainbow Coalition suggesting the challenge for groups seeking an open and
responsive political process.
Counting
VEP, about fifteen organizations now conduct voter participation work in
low-income and minority communities. Only two of these are based in the South,
although half of them have operations somewhere in the region. The
proliferation of voter registration groups has intensified competition over
scarce dollars, local constituencies, and skilled organizers, without providing
local capacity to respond to basic participation problems. In local
communities, groups historically constituted for voter participation work now
struggle without much assistance and are actively solicited by partisan
factions.
Partisanship
is a fact of life in the new Southern politics, posing difficult problems for
traditional tactics. Partisanship will be exaggerated by the increase in black
elected officials. Conclusions about the precise impact of partisanship are
difficult given the rapid pace of change. However, certain features are clear.
The new mobilization is not a strategy for empowerment. It is primarily
effective in influencing the direction of the vote rather than the quality of
participation or input beyond election day. It is beneficial insofar as such
mobilization helps sustain some voter turnout. Partisan mobilization tends to
be episodic and personality-driven. It seems to increase the role of money in
elections. It is of limited impact in low-profile elections even when the
issues being decided are vitally important to minorities.
Current
levels of registration and turnout suggest that partisan mobilization is not a
viable substitute for traditional voter registration work. It does not seem
capable of addressing the legacy of discrimination or the sense of uncertainty
about the efficacy of the vote that is behind minority under-participation. To
leave the exercise of voting rights to partisan mobilization will mean that the
historic struggle to enfranchise black Southerners will lose its potential as a
democratizing force and become reduced to mere politics-as-usual.
What
can be done? Nothing easily. Because philanthropy gives its funds to
non-political groups, its predisposition favors litigation strategies which are
safe from charges of partisan involvement. As we have seen, however, the
benefits to be expected from litigation are diminishing and low voter
participation among minorities may actually have begun to undercut the benefits
of redistricting. Proponents of voter registration should avoid putting so many
eggs in the litigation basket and return to providing support for
organizational community-based work designed to register and vote the
population. This is no simple matter. Persisting underparticipation and
partisan domination of the electoral agenda raise difficult strategic problems
for groups working to expand minority participation.
Improvements
in official voting policies are still needed at both the state and federal
levels. But formal changes in state policies are not a substitute for
community-based organizational work. Any overall strategy will necessarily
develop out of experiences in local communities--rather than top down. Targets
of opportunity must be pursued by placing resources in places where there are
realistic chances of making gains. A regional organization, in the tradition of
VEP, could be pivotal in the process.
Above
all some organization needs to plunge in to systematically collect and analyze
information on what is happening in the aftermath of the recent reforms.
Research associated with voting rights litigation provides some interesting
illustrations about how to answer these questions. But the case-by-case nature
of this work does not facilitate the systematic generalization needed now.
The
Voting Rights Act, the federal courts, and an experienced bar remain in place
to protect against wrongdoing by state officials, but the main line of defense
against vote dilution is increasingly becoming that of informed citizens taking
action in local communities. Strategies to promote full participation in
Southern politics have varied over time as activists have struggled to overcome
voting practices that were among the nation's most restrictive and
discriminatory. Successful adjustments have resulted in significant change
yielding a more open political process today. Another shift is necessary now if
the historically disfranchised are to consolidate past gains and continue the
march towards a just political system.
As this article was being written, Political
scientist Alex Willingham was research director of the Southern Regional
Council.
